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Abstract King Benjamin, in an attempt to establish and promote peace, created a form of government that may
be understood as democratic. The political system is
not a democracy in the way the term is understood
today, but the democratic elements become especially
clear when viewed next to its autocratic Lamanite
counterpart. Davis demonstrates how a democratic
system tends to bring more peace to a nation and,
interestingly, also more victory when war does come
upon them. The young Nephite state encountered the
types of risks experienced in the modern progression
to democracy, further illustrating how difficult a task
it would have been for Joseph Smith to create this
world. Although the democractic state played a role in
the Nephite nation, the most important lesson in the
Book of Mormon’s politics is that God makes all the
difference.
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Come Forth, by Walter Rane.
Copyright By the Hand of Mormon Foundation.

•

WAR & DEMOCRACY IN THE

~
And now let us be wise and look
forward to these things, and do that which
will make for the peace of this people.
(mosiah 29:10)

W

hen king mosiah changes the form of Nephite government,
he acts with certain purposes in mind. Among these is the
establishment of peace. In his speech proposing a reign of
judges instead of kings, he explains, “I myself have labored with all the
power and faculties which I have possessed, to teach you the commandments of God, and to establish peace throughout the land, that there
should be no wars nor contentions” (Mosiah 29:14; see also 29:40). How
can altering the institutions of governance alone make a society more
peaceful? Although Mosiah himself may not have known exactly how
the institutional changes he implemented would affect the prospects for
peace, modern study of political regimes illuminates how his decision
was inspired.
Understanding the institutional structure of the Nephite society
allows limited but definable predictions about what political outcomes
we should expect and how they should transpire. In this paper I first
explain the ways in which the regime established by Mosiah may be
understood as democratic. Next I argue that the democratic features
of Mosiah’s state are sufficient to predict that it will be inclined toward
peace but comparatively strong in war. However, democratic transitions
also entail significant risks, and the initial problems encountered in the
reign of the judges correspond to the contemporary understanding of
the perils of democratization. In each of these aspects, modern research
about political behavior helps give us a clearer glimpse into the politics
of the Book of Mormon. But while the relationship between politics and
war found in the Book of Mormon makes sense from the perspective of
modern political science, it differs from the widespread political understanding of Joseph Smith’s time. That does not mean the Book of Mormon’s political institutions offer “evidence” in favor of its authenticity.
Instead I hope to show that considering the nuances of the Nephite state
can deepen our appreciation for the Book of Mormon’s complex internal unity. I will consider the expected proclivity of the Nephite state
for conflict, its expected success in conflict, and, finally, what internal
events we might anticipate in early Nephite “democracy.”1 To begin, I
seek to clarify the term democracy.
	journal of Book of Mormon Studies
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Understanding Book of
Mormon Governance
The Book of Mormon reveals a significant
amount of information about the types of political institutions governing both the Nephite and
Lamanite populations. Much of what we observe
in its politics has a familiar feel. Nevertheless, a
common mistake is to map the transition from
monarchy to the reign of the judges too easily onto
familiar political structures. Mosiah’s new regime
is not a democracy as the term is understood in
contemporary society. Unlike American democracy,
there is no legislative branch. By modern standards,
other nondemocratic elements include that the chief
judge is not apparently limited in his term of office
and that judges not only govern but also “reign,” to
point out a few examples (see Alma 1:2; 60:21). And
although political dynasties do occur in democratic
states, the anticipation of familial succession seems
especially strong in Nephite governance.2 Further, it
is unclear whether the “voice of the people” implies
democratic choice in creating the set of possible
political options or only in choosing among a set
arranged by leaders.3
Part of the problem in understanding Book of
Mormon politics is that Nephite society is temporally and culturally
removed from our
experience, and part of
the problem is in “the
paucity of democracy as
an analytic concept.”4
A state’s level of democracy is best thought
of as a continuum
between poles of complete democracy and
autocracy. The relevant
question is whether the
state is democratic in
ways that will meaningfully influence the
policy outcomes under
consideration.
It is in this limited but important
sense that the regime
established by Mosiah
should be considered
a democracy. First,

although the “ ‘voice of the people’ entered only
marginally into the appointment of an officer
who essentially enjoyed life tenure and hereditary
succession,”5 interaction need not be expansive to
have a substantial impact.6 In Nephite politics, the
withdrawal of authority through the voice of the
people was a very real possibility (see Alma 2:3;
Alma 51:7; Helaman 5:1–2), creating incentives for
officials to avoid alienating large constituencies.
Second, the system of laws put into effect may
be characterized as liberal in the sense of being, to
a significant extent, value neutral. That is, people in
Mosiah’s system were free to select whatever personal projects they wanted to pursue. The reader is
plainly told that people were afforded the liberty to
teach doctrine contrary to the church’s—provided
they at least claimed to honestly believe it—because
the law had no control over a person’s belief (see
Alma 1:15–18; 30:7). The institutions of a liberal
democracy do not prescribe values to subjects, but
rather aim to create a situation of fairness in which
citizens may autonomously select values. The process is determined; the ends are not. Authority for
choosing personal goals has been devolved from
a king or sovereign to the collectively sovereign
people. It is in this way, I think, that the “freedom”
Mosiah grants his people comes in the form
of greater responsibility
(see Mosiah 29:31–32).
Third, although
it is true that there
are no interagency
constitutional checks
in the Nephite state,7
there do appear to be
intra-agency checks. In
monarchy the problem
is not in dividing power
but in consolidating
it. In democracy the
problem is reversed.
The government must
be able to act, so it must
have real power. All
governments confront
collective action problems, and they must
have power to enforce
their decisions collec-

As Madison recognized,
democracy is unstable unless it is
carefully crafted to balance
power within the government.
In Mosiah’s system this
balance is achieved by allowing
a group of lower judges to
challenge the rule of a higher
judge and higher judges to revise
the decisions of lower judges.
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tively to be efficacious.
However, if any one
actor seeks to gather
powers already divided
among others, the actor
will face incentives to
avoid relinquishing
them. Consequently,
the authority of government must not completely reside in any
one location. As James
Madison recognized,
democracy is unstable
unless it is carefully
crafted to balance
power within the government.8 In Mosiah’s
system this balance is
achieved by allowing a
group of lower judges
to challenge the rule
of a higher judge and
higher judges to revise the decisions of lower judges
(see Mosiah 29:28–29). The arrow of power points
both directions, providing for the kind of stability
found within democratic regimes.
The democratic elements within Nephite governance are particularly clear when juxtaposed with
the autocratic Lamanite counterpart. Much less is
known about the Lamanite state, but we are told
that Lamoni’s father is recognized as “king over all
the land” (Alma 20:8). As such, he had authority to
“govern” or interfere in the decisions of lesser kings
(Alma 20:26). The general recognition of his authority suggests the presence of a unitary political state,
and his ability to intervene at his discretion indicates
the extent of his personal power. Together these features characterize Lamanite politics as autocratic.
The combination of a liberal, democratic Nephite
state and an illiberal, nondemocratic Lamanite
regime forms a specific type of international structure, about which predictions can be made.

Prussian philosopher
of note, was the first
theorist to seriously
consider the international implications of
a democratic regime
type. From his writings,
a large literature has
developed around the
thesis that democratic
states are more peaceful
than nondemocracies,
regardless of leaders or
culture.9 Though I cannot represent the many
theoretical variants of
this view, the fundamental idea is simple:
under democracy, leaders are constrained
from fighting wars
because their peoples
are involved in making
the choice to fight. Because the populace bears more
of the costs of war than elites, they are more likely
to oppose bellicose leaders, giving officials second
thoughts about aggression. Second, populations are
more likely to be peaceful because democratic countries may be less likely to see foreign populations as
necessarily antagonistic.10 Although the basic point
has not been accepted by everyone, the “democratic
peace” has been described as the closest thing to an
empirical law in international politics.11
One way the democratic peace has been empirically tested is through examining particular case
studies closely. That way, the correspondence of the
specific case to the theory may be checked at different points to see whether each theoretically anticipated element is present. This increases the number
of observations without increasing the number of
studies and is considered an appropriate way of
investigating the democratic peace thesis.12 Through
this process we can assess causality by focusing
on just a few instances of a social phenomenon.
The question is not just if something happened as
expected but how it happened. Below, I will apply
this technique to the Book of Mormon. Clearly
the democratic regime set up by Mosiah fought
wars frequently (by modern standards), but his
state’s pacific nature may still be evaluated through

Under democracy, leaders are
constrained from fighting wars
because their peoples are involved
in making the choice to fight.
Because the populace bears more
of the costs of war than elites,
they are more likely to oppose
bellicose leaders, giving officials
second thoughts about aggression.

Seeking for Peace
If the Book of Mormon presents two types of
regimes existing alongside each other, what are
the most basic expectations that can be articulated about their interaction? Immanuel Kant, the

	journal of Book of Mormon Studies

45

iniquity out of the land,
contrasting the desires
lest they overrun us
of actors in different
and destroy us. (Alma
positions.
26:25)
When the norms and
institutions of Nephite
We contrast this with
democracy are considthe Nephites’ reception
ered, several indicators
of the Anti-Nephi-Lehies.
demonstrate a tendency
Nowhere can the Nephito avert war insofar as it
tes’ prior prejudice be
was possible. Prefacing
found. When Ammon
the long series of chap“tr[ies] the hearts” of the
ters on war, Mormon
Nephites to see if they
describes at length how
will allow the converted
Alma and Amulek are brought before the judges and lawyers of
Captain Moroni and the
Lamanites to assume
Ammonihah. Jerry Thompson. © IRI.
Nephites did not desire to
residence in Nephite terfight, engaging in bloodritory, the Lamanite king
shed only with extreme
is so concerned that he suggests he would prefer
compunction (see Alma 43:29, 54). Pahoran, the
to perish (Alma 27:10, 15).13 However, when the
democratically elected leader of Moroni’s day, is
“voice of the people” is returned, it is in support of
even more loath to participate in acts of war. Late in
the peaceful integration of former adversaries. The
the conflict, Pahoran still worries “whether it should
change from advocating offense to reconciliation
be just in us to go against our brethren,” despite
is substantial. This is particularly significant if, as
such internal war maneuvers being conducted by
John Sorenson has suggested, the practice of peacethe Nephite government not long before (Alma
ful acceptance of other peoples was a consistent fea61:19). Apparently, this was in fact a “social norm”
ture of the Nephite state.14 The cultural explanation
established within the Nephite state and, in times of
for the democratic peace offers one way of explainconflict, externalized. Mormon editorializes:
ing why the Nephites did not consider other peoples
a threat while the Lamanites did (see Alma 17:20).15
Now the Nephites were taught to defend themContrasting several antidemocratic foils with
selves against their enemies, even to the shedMosiah’s system sheds further light on the problem.
ding of blood if it were necessary; yea, and
The Book of Mormon is replete with leaders who
they were also taught never to give an offense,
incite conflicts in which their constituents are made
yea, and never to raise the sword except it were
to suffer for their leaders’ gain. A mere mention
against an enemy, except it were to preserve
of the names Laman, Amalickiah, Ammoron,
their lives. (Alma 48:14)
Gadianton, Zerahemnah (and, less conspicuously,
What can be made of this analysis? To say that
Giddianhi, Tubaloth, and Amlici) is probably sufthe Nephites had traditions against conflict does not
ficient. Typically leaders have a profound and posprove these norms were necessarily connected to
sibly deterministic effect on society’s direction. The
democratic governance. Any reader of the Book of
judges and lawyers of Ammonihah conspired to roll
Mormon knows, of course, that this disinclination
back the state’s democratic institutions and were
to go to war was according to the instructions of
willing to resort to violence to achieve their goals
God. The word of God is all-important; still, a few
(see Alma 8:17; 10:27). Likewise, the Zoramites’
hints indicate that institutions do matter. Ammon
decision-making process was secretive, deciding
recounts that, before the transition to democracy,
policy not by public discussion (the voice of the
the Nephites had believed any effort to convert their
people) but by private fact-finding (see Alma 35:5).
Lamanite brethren would ultimately be doomed to
Gadianton, the arch-villain, thrived through the
fail. Rather than use the word of God to convert
preservation of internal and external mysteriousness
them, the Nephites advocated the opposite:
(see Helaman 2:4). The secret combination must
And moreover they did say: Let us take up arms
recoil against democracy. Exclusive, violent societies
against them, that we destroy them and their
tend to be undemocratic. Excepting a few excep46
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tional monarchs, nondemocratic decision making
typically foments injustice and conflict.
By my count, there are only two instances in the
Book of Mormon in which a populace goads a righteous leader into conflict. The first example is that of
Limhi’s people (see Mosiah 21:6), and the second is
Mormon’s decision to lead the Nephites despite their
wickedness (see Mormon 5:1–2). In both cases, the
government in place (one might argue there is not
really much of a government at all in the latter case)
is nondemocratic. Also, by my count, in the only
other instance of a populace attempting to coerce a
righteous leader into conflict, Gidgiddoni tells the
Nephites that such an act of aggression would necessarily end in failure (see 3 Nephi 3:20–21). Part of
the reason may be that the institutions Gidgiddoni
faced were structurally more averse to aggression.
This contrasts especially with occasions on which
Lamanite kings attempt to compel their fearful
subjects to prepare for war against the Nephites.16
Indeed, Lamanites and dissenters even figured the
Nephites’ pacific disposition into their battle plans,
perhaps using it as a reason to adopt the tactic of
surprise (see Alma 2; 25:1–3; 49; Helaman 4). This
as well is consistent with modern social science’s
finding that democracies are frequently targeted by
aggressors.17
Of course, none
of this proves that
democracy made the
difference. It is difficult
to envision Moroni,
for instance, doing or
believing something
because he was “institutionally constrained.”
But this may not tell
the whole story. Leaders like Moroni and
Pahoran do not gain
power arbitrarily.
Rather, they have
authority; their ability
to use power is invested
to them by a larger set
of people (see Alma
43:17; 46:34). When
kings rule without electoral consent, they may
make war for personal

reasons or for the benefit of a boisterous or influential minority. When this selectorate is expanded to
an electorate, the interests that government actors
represent become more diverse, incorporating many
who always prefer to avoid war. In either case, the
leader may act to appease or satisfy those who give
him power. Deciding who these people are has
much to do with state-level policy preferences. Usually the more democratic the authorizing body, the
more inclined toward peace its representatives will
be. The Nephites did fight, particularly to regain
lost territory (see Helaman 4), but their wars were
undertaken from a broadly peaceful viewpoint.

Winning in War
In the preceding section I have considered
one of the major facets of democratic peace theory
and illustrated how the Book of Mormon might
be contemplated through its lens. I will now turn
to the second major theoretical proposition, that
democracies fight more effectively than nondemocracies. Two related explanations for this view can be
provided. First, David Lake has used an economic
rationale to explain why democracies are not only
disinclined to conflict, but, perhaps paradoxically,
are also more likely to win conflicts they do enter.18
All states provide protection to their citizens, but not all states
provide protection
equally.19 In autocratic
states, elites are secure
in their control of the
government as a result
of barriers to political
participation. Because
they are unlikely to be
removed from office,
autocratic rulers can
tax their peoples more
heavily while providing fewer services in
return—including the
service of protection
from foreign aggressors. In other words,
the state is less secure
because rulers can line
their pockets with state

In a democracy leaders may
be removed from office more
readily, so they are less inclined
to sacrifice collective protection
for personal gain. The result
is that society is typically not
exploited by the state and
the economy functions more
efficiently, producing greater
aggregate wealth.
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King Noah and his soldiers react with anger when the prophet Abinadi condemns the king and his people for their wickedness. Abinadi Had
Testified, by Walter Rane. Copyright By the Hand of Mormon Foundation.

revenues rather than devoting funds to protecting
its people.
In a democracy leaders may be removed from
office more readily, so they are less inclined to sacrifice collective protection for personal gain. The
result is that society is typically not exploited by the
state, and the economy functions more efficiently,
producing greater aggregate wealth.20 Because
democracies have more wealth, they face incentives to pay for more protection (e.g., maintaining
a larger army). Because they have more to lose in
confrontation with autocratic states,21 their citizens
are more willing to dedicate the human and material resources necessary to prevail in conflict.22 This
forms the basis of the second explanation, which is
that democratic soldiers fight better than autocratic
soldiers. Democratic soldiers have more at stake in
the state and expect worse treatment if captured.23
This particularly equips democracies to prevail in
protracted conflicts with nondemocratic rivals.24
Because the Book of Mormon contains a remark48
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able number of conflicts within a democratic/
nondemocratic dyad, we can check this theoretical
prediction.
Before Mosiah’s implementation of a democratic system, conflicts between the Nephites and
the Lamanites show a decidedly mixed record. A
decisive Nephite defeat is alluded to in the opening verses of the book of Omni (see 1:6–7), but
King Benjamin thereafter wins a decisive victory
(see Omni 1:24; Words of Mormon 1:13). Zeniff, a
just Nephite king, wins a battle against the Lamanites (see Mosiah 10:20), but his grandson Limhi,
also a just king, loses three consecutively (see
Mosiah 21:3–12). In the postdemocratic wars tragically reported by Mormon, the record is similarly
ambiguous.
The case of King Noah deserves particular mention. Among the first things we learn about Noah
is that he lays a stiff tax on his people, extracting
his society’s wealth for personal gain (see Mosiah
11:3–4). Maintaining much panoply in glorifying

his people (see Mosiah 11:18–19), Noah’s real investment is in his own fortune, building “elegant and
spacious buildings,” ornamentations, and “a great
tower” (11:8–14). Noah’s priests speak “flattering
words” to the people (a point emphasized repeatedly). Apparently convinced, the people continue to
“labor exceedingly” to support the elites and king
(11:6). The story is typical of a despotic, autocratic
regime: a demagogic leader exploits his people by
fomenting partisan allegiance while using the state
to pursue purely personal desires. Soon enough, in
such cases, economic output begins to lag. In a profligate display of idleness, he causes himself and his
people to become “wine-bibber[s]” (11:15). Wealth is
neither produced nor utilized efficiently. Inevitably,
under such conditions, security suffers. Noah fails to
supply “a sufficient number” of guards for his fields
(11:17), and a conflict with the Lamanites ensues.
Still, he is superficially triumphant as the enemy is
“driven back”—ominously—“for a time” (11:18).
As the text suggests, victory will be short-lived.
Despite his success, “the forces of the king were
small, having been reduced” (Mosiah 19:2). The
reader might even infer that Noah has exploited his
people precisely to the possible limit—his collection
of taxes is such that a “lesser part” of the people
overcome the barriers to political participation,
and they begin to “breathe out threatenings against
the king” (Mosiah 19:3). Hence, he has maximized
wealth by approaching the threshold where the
political participation necessary to eliminate him is
almost attained. By this time it is simply too late for
the regime; King Noah realizes he cannot even hope
to mount an effective defense against the Lamanites
when conflict becomes inevitable (see Mosiah 19:11).
A very different picture emerges after the transition to democracy in Mosiah 29. For Book of Mormon democracy to be compatible with the social
scientific theory presented here, several different
expectations need to be satisfied. The Nephite state
would need to show a higher level of success in military conflict, and this success would need to correspond with greater wealth and a greater willingness of the populace to sustain military operations.
An examination of the postdemocratization period
reveals each of these features distinctly.
Although some variance in delineating is possible (see table 1 on page 50 for my coding), there are
roughly fourteen military conflicts between Mosiah
29 and 3 Nephi 7, at which point the period of

democratic rule ends with the collapse of Mosiah’s
system. The outcomes of these conflicts are also
variant, but overall, the Nephite state’s success is
remarkable. At least ten conflicts appear to be clear
Nephite victories, with the remaining four offering
ambivalent but noteworthy cases.
In its first crucible, Alma’s regime displays significant strength and solidarity; even after incurring serious casualties in two early battles with the
Amlicites (see Alma 2:17, 28), the Nephites have
sufficient force (and, just as important, sufficient
political will) to send “a numerous army” against
an Amlicite and Lamanite wave (Alma 3:23). Next,
after failing to heed Alma’s prophetic warnings,
the substantial Nephite city of Ammonihah suffers a categorical defeat at the hands of a Lamanite
invasion (see Alma 16:2). The clearest example
of a Nephite loss over the expanse of the reign of
the judges, this battle at first appears to show that
Mosiah’s system is an inadequate assurance of protection. However, on closer examination this begins
to look more like the exception that proves the
rule. The people of Ammonihah, though part of the
Nephite system of governance, were not democratic
participants as much as undemocratic subversives
(see Alma 8:17).
The Nephites win further victories in the brief
but severe battle in Alma 28, the conflict against
Zarahemnah (Alma 43–44), the great war extending roughly from Alma 46 through 62, the short but
independent conflict in Alma 63, the war against
Coriantumr (Helaman 1:14–34), and the battles
against Giddianhi (3 Nephi 4:1–14) and Zemnarihah
(3 Nephi 4:15–33). Overall, the extent of military
success for the Nephite democracy is astonishing.
All battles are uncertain, but the only really
close call in this group is in the war of Alma 46–62,
a conflict which stands out so distinctly that it is
commonly spoken of as “the war” between the
Nephites and Lamanites. Although the Nephites
finally rout the Lamanite aggressors, they come so
close to defeat that even the great Moroni, who had
before guaranteed victory in his polemical epistle to
Ammoron (see Alma 54:5–14), begins to doubt the
outcome (see Alma 59:11–12). The Book of Mormon
leaves no room to speculate about why the Nephites
brush up against destruction at this point in their
history. It is not because their system of government
goes bad but because it comes perilously close to
being overthrown. Moroni makes clear:
	journal of Book of Mormon Studies
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Table 1: War in the Nephite World
Passage

Leaders/Groups

Regime Type

Time

Outcome

Omni 1:5–7

Amaron (records war)

Nondemocratic

279 bc

Defeat

Omni 1:24

King Benjamin

Nondemocratic

279–130 bc*

Victory

Mosiah 10:20

Zeniff

Nondemocratic

160 bc

Victory

Mosiah 11:18–19

Noah

Nondemocratic

150 bc

Victory

Mosiah 19

Noah

Nondemocratic

145 bc

Defeat

Mosiah 20:11

Limhi

Nondemocratic

145–122 bc*

Victory

Mosiah 21:6–8

Limhi

Nondemocratic

145–122 bc*

Defeat

Mosiah 21:11

Limhi

Nondemocratic

145–122 bc*

Defeat

Mosiah 21:12

Limhi

Nondemocratic

145–122 bc*

Defeat

Alma 2:17–38

Alma vs. Amlici

Democratic

RJ 5, 87 bc

Victory

Alma 3:20–24

Alma (Nephites) vs. Amlicites/
Lamanites

Democratic

RJ 5, 87 bc

Victory

Alma 16:2–3

Ammonihah/Nehors vs.
Lamanites

Democratic

RJ 11, 81 bc

Defeat

Alma 16:5–8

Zoram

Democratic

RJ 11, 81 bc

Victory

Alma 28:1–3

Nephite vs. Lamanite

Democratic

RJ 15, 76 bc

Victory

Alma 43–44

Moroni vs. Zerahemnah

Democratic

RJ 18, 74 bc

Victory

Alma 46–62

Moroni vs. Amalickiah/Ammoron

Democratic

RJ 19–31, 73–60 bc

Victory
Victory

Alma 63:15

Moronihah

Democratic

RJ 39, 52 bc

Helaman 1:14–34

Moronihah vs. Coriantumr

Democratic

RJ 41, 51 bc

Victory

Helaman 4

Moronihah

Democratic

RJ 57–62, 35–30 bc

Undecided

Helaman 11

?

Democratic

RJ 80, 12 bc

Defeat

Helaman 11

?

Democratic

RJ 81, 11 bc

Undecided

3 Nephi 4:1–14

Gidgiddoni/Lachoneus vs.
Giddianhi (robber)

Democratic

RJ 110, ad 18

Victory

3 Nephi 4:15–33

Gidgiddoni/Lachoneus vs.
Zemnarihah

Democratic

RJ 113, ad 21

Victory

Mormon 2:4

Mormon vs. Lamanites

Nondemocratic

ad 327–328*

Defeat

Mormon 2:9

Mormon vs. Aaron

Nondemocratic

ad 331

Victory

Mormon 2:16

Mormon vs. Lamanites

Nondemocratic

ad 345

Defeat

Mormon 3:7

Mormon vs. Lamanites

Nondemocratic

ad 361

Victory

Mormon 3:8

Mormon vs. Lamanites

Nondemocratic

ad 362

Victory

Mormon 4:2

Nephites vs. Lamanites

Nondemocratic

ad 363

Defeat

Mormon 4:7–8

Nephites vs. Lamanites

Nondemocratic

ad 364

Victory

Mormon 4:13–14

Nephites vs. Lamanites

Nondemocratic

ad 367

Defeat

Mormon 4:15

Nephites vs. Lamanites

Nondemocratic

ad 367

Victory

Mormon 4:16–6:15

Mormon vs. Lamanites

Nondemocratic

ad 375–385

Defeat

“Outcome” and “Regime Type” columns reference the Nephite state (i.e., What is the outcome for the Nephite regime?). “Time” is given in
years according to the reign of the judges (RJ), when appropriate, prior to the date. *Indicates “between” dates given.
Explanatory Note: Conflicts are delineated, as much as possible, according to textual breaks. When forces disengage and then return, with an
observed outcome to the first engagement reported, two battles are counted. Typically, this breaks battles into the smallest components recognizable. The exception is the prolonged conflict from Alma 46 to Alma 62, which is coded as one. This is because there is no separation of
forces, and because it is explicitly treated as one war (Alma 62:41).
Summary: During the democratic period, the Nephites win 71 percent of military conflicts and lose 21 percent. During the nondemocratic
period, the Nephites win 47 percent of conflicts and lose 53 percent.
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However, this test reveals
something about the state’s
capability when pushed to
its limits. After the crushing
Lamanite assault, Moronihah
succeeds in the difficult task
of rolling back the invasion
in “many parts of the land”
(Helaman 4:9). While Nephite commanders knew that
holding ground is preferable
to taking it (see Alma 59:9),
this example represents a
recurrent theme in Nephite
warfare. After Coriantumr
amazes even himself in his
Though not its
sacking of Zarahemla (see
central focus, the
Helaman 1:19–22), MoroniBook of Mormon
hah uses the latent strength of
repeatedly details
the Nephite state to surround
the importance of
and crush Coriantumr’s
institutions. From the
forces (see 1:25–33). Earlier,
early recognition that
Amalickiah sweeps through
those in positions of
Nephite lands, but the Nephiinstitutional authortes commence retaking lands
ity played a pivotal
The
criminal
Gadianton
attempted
to
destroy
the
democratic
governalmost as soon as the pace
role in deciding the
ment of the Nephites. Gadianton Defies His Pursuers, by Minerva
of the war slows and forces
Nephites’ survival
Teichert. Courtesy of Brigham Young University Museum of Art. All
become entrenched (see
Rights Reserved.
(see Alma 10:27) to
Alma 51).
the series of conflicts
The
trend
that
emerges
from this analysis is
revolving around who had the right to control such
that
short
conflicts
(such
as
those at Ammonihah
positions (see Alma 54:17; 3 Nephi 3:16), we see
or Coriantumr’s blitzkrieg-style campaign) favor
continued awareness of this fact. Another hint is
the Lamanite autocracy, but extended conflicts are
Mormon’s dark adumbration that the Gadiantons
ultimately won by the Nephite democracy. We recall
will “prove the overthrow, yea, almost the entire
that the theoretical reason democracies are expected
destruction of the people of Nephi” (Helaman 2:13).
to succeed in conflicts is that they can direct greater
Accustomed to the pattern of institutions matterresources over an extended period of time. While
ing, we see this prophecy already in the early stages
democracies may lose in the short term, “in every
of fulfillment once the robbers “obtain the sole
prolonged conflict in modern history, such states
management of the government” (Helaman 6:39).
have prevailed over their illiberal rivals.”25 The
Within this pattern we can make sense of Moroni’s
comparative wealth of the Nephite state as well
focus on cleansing the “inward vessel” of governas its potential for the quick acquisition of wealth
ment before looking to external foes (Alma 60:24).
(suggesting high productivity) are both noted in
The only battle excluded at this point is that in
the Book of Mormon.26 It is during the democratic
which the combined forces of the Nephite dissentperiod that the productive capacity of the Nephite
ers and Lamanites drive deep into Nephite lands
state is most conspicuously channeled to military
fighting against Moronihah (see Helaman 4). For
endeavors. Moroni undertakes an extensive project
some time the battle stalls in what looks to be a
of city construction and fortification, with impresprotracted stalemate (see Helaman 4:18), and the
sive military results (see Alma 49, especially 49:8).
Nephite state faces an exceptional circumstance in
which its very existence is jeopardized (see 4:20).
We could have
withstood our
enemies that they
could have gained
no power over us
. . . had it not been
for the war which
broke out amongst
ourselves; yea, were
it not for these
king-men, who
caused so much
bloodshed among
ourselves. (Alma
60:15–16)
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Captain Moroni led the Nephites in their struggle to maintain their democratic government. Moroni and the Title of Liberty, by Minerva Teichert.
Courtesy of Brigham Young University Museum of Art. All Rights Reserved.

According to the theoretical logic, democracies should prevail because they have both greater
resources to draw upon and greater political will to
do so, for a long time if necessary. The above analysis considers the efficacy and capacity of Nephite
democracy, but the Book of Mormon makes additional claims about the Nephites’ resilience. In contemporary theory the additional benefits granted
by democracy create an incentive for democratic
citizens to express a willingness to invest a great
deal of blood and treasure into state preservation.
Conversely, citizens of nondemocracies lack this
incentive and may even prefer regime change since
the possibility for improvement is greater in less
desirable political states.
The wars of Captain Moroni ideally exhibit this
phenomenon. Moroni knows that, in contrast to
the Lamanite desire for conquest, the Nephites will
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fight to preserve their “lands, and their liberty, and
their church” (Alma 43:30). It would be difficult to
express the benefits of the archetypal procedural
democracy more clearly than with the three ideals of democracy Moroni recognizes—individually
owned property, political freedom, private rather
than official religiosity. The reader need not doubt
the pivotal role these benefits play in generating
public support for the war, as they form the centerpiece of Moroni’s appeal to hold the line against the
king-men (see Alma 46). Later, upon recognizing
Pahoran’s government in exile to be on the brink
of collapse, the people “flock” to his call to arms
to defend the same set of rights (Alma 61:6). The
Nephite people do seem to recognize, often at least,
the worth of Mosiah’s gift (or rather, the Lord’s gift
through Mosiah).

Although the Nephite’s democratic government was designed to promote peace, the Nephites and Lamanites engaged in several serious wars
through the course of the book of Alma. Battle, by Jorge Cocco Santangelo. May not be copied. For information see www.jorgecocco.com.

Tempering Optimism: Challenges
in New Democr acies
No political scientist has ever theorized Zion.27
Instead, all institutional choices entail trade-offs,
and Mosiah is well aware of the possible sacrifices
his shift to democracy carries. It is because righteous kings cannot be guaranteed indefinitely,
and also perhaps because of the position in which
he finds himself, that Mosiah opts for democracy
(see Mosiah 29:13). He harbors no illusions about
democracy being a panacea, nor should the Book of
Mormon history be read to inspire any.
Philippe Schmitter examines possible predicaments that frequently plague nascent democracies.28
“All new democracies,” according to Schmitter,
“if they are to consolidate a viable set of political institutions, must make difficult choices.”29
Among the problems confronting democracies are
“free-riding” and “policy-cycling.”30 In free riding, citizens achieve the benefits of collective goods
without participating in producing them. Before
institutional roles have solidified, new systems can
be replete with opportunities for free gains. After
all, it is not yet clear how wealth will be distributed,
so critical choices can be made for profit. Korihor

accuses Alma of free riding (see Alma 30:27). Nehor
preaches the gospel of free riding (see Alma 1:3);
what a great idea to be popular, to not have to labor
with one’s own hands! What more appealing political position could there be?
Such appeal is at the heart of the Nehor’s program. It may be interesting that he appears as the
first test of the new state, in the first year of the
reign of the judges. On reflection, a powerful logic
underscores Nehor’s choice. Under the system of
kings, the presentation of an opposing political
platform would have little effect at all. If the king
disagreed with a political manifesto, it would be
ignored or suppressed. Candidacy means nothing
in monarchy. All of this changes once the acquisition of power by others becomes a viable possibility.
Nehor’s purpose is to attain money and support
(see Alma 1:5), the two critical elements of any successful political activity. When Alma accuses him
of priestcraft and of its enforcement, he reveals that
Nehor’s dissidence has assumed a politicized tenor.31
According to Alma, it is when priestcraft rises to
this political level that it becomes especially pernicious (see Alma 1:12).
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The second
dilemma, policy
cycling, occurs when
new democracies—not
having developed stable
political positions—
encounter “unstable
majorities formed by
shifting coalitions . . .
alienating everyone.”32
Amlici’s story, four
years after Nehor and
still early in Nephite
democracy, is the
quintessential tale of
alienation. In a dramatic election with
widely differing alternatives, exactly how the
political majority will
coalesce is uncertain, as
manifest by the “alarming” nature of Amlici’s
challenge (Alma 2:3). When the majority does take
Alma’s side, Amlici defects rather than accept the
outcome, a tactic familiar to unconsolidated democracies. There is no prior tradition of peaceful change
in power, nor in peaceful ceding of power. Without
such a tradition, politically ambitious men cannot
know for certain the costs of conceding power. This
creates an incentive to cling to the chance for power,
just as Amlici does.
These problems are more likely in a new
democratic state than in an old (and especially a
righteous) monarchy.33 Mosiah may have experienced these types of internal problems, but none
are reported prior to democratization. Instead we
know only that he “had established peace in the
land” (Mosiah 29:40). Democracy would carry
risks and responsibilities, as Mosiah understood
and impressed on his people (see Mosiah 29:27,
30). Remarkably, the risks the young Nephite state
encountered typify those generally experienced during the modern progression to democracy.

that the above arguments assist in compelling belief. They hopefully underscore the
book’s significance and
complexity. Believers in
the Book of Mormon
can better understand
the claims the book
makes about itself as
we gain knowledge
about why and how
prophetic pronouncements are fulfilled.
Mosiah departed from
centuries of political tradition because
he believed doing so
would allow his people
to achieve peace as long
as they acted wisely.34
Although it might seem
that the period following his rule was especially tumultuous, the historical record bears out the truth of Mosiah’s departing counsel. Sadly, the blessing of Mosiah’s system
only becomes completely clear after it had been
destroyed. It is then that the people “united in the
hatred of those who had entered into a covenant to
destroy the government” (3 Nephi 7:11).
I should also emphasize that this paper seeks
to highlight an aspect of the Book of Mormon worthy of attention, not to obscure one of the book’s
central themes. The most basic lesson in the Book
of Mormon’s politics is simple: God makes all the
difference. Our Father in Heaven is all-powerful—
whether the adversary is Laban’s fifty or his hypothetical tens of thousands doesn’t matter (see
1 Nephi 4:1).
What, then, is the point? When God works
miracles he works them according to his will. Often,
we know, God works in unsensational ways. “I say
unto you, that by small and simple things are great
things brought to pass,” Alma tells his son (Alma
37:6). Often this is understood to mean that great
things are brought to pass by those who are neither
powerful nor prominent by worldly standards. In
this sense the “simple” are the humble followers of
Christ. I presume something along these lines is
correct, but another possible reading of the term

It is because righteous
kings cannot be guaranteed
indefinitely, and also perhaps
because of the position in which he
finds himself, that Mosiah
opts for democracy. He harbors
no illusions about democracy
being a panacea, nor should the
Book of Mormon history be
read to inspire any.

Conclusion: Therefore, what?
Ultimately my perspective is devotional rather
than evidentiary. Lacking a systematic way of determining a criterion for evidence, I do not suggest
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simple is natural, or organic. God uses natural
processes—those explainable without use of an
appeal to divine intercession—to accomplish his
purposes. When God blesses his people with success, it is sometimes through this kind of “simple”
means.
Mosiah changed the Nephites’ political institutions because he understood that the kind of state a
people live in could make a relevant temporal and
spiritual difference in their lives (see Mosiah 29,
especially 29:17, 23). All too often, actors will do
precisely what institutions allow them to do—a conclusion of scripture as much as of scholarship (see
D&C 121:39). The more insulated political leaders
are in exercising their invested authority, the greater
the barriers to political entry by others will be. In
turn, this permits leaders to exploit their peoples.
When personal wealth trumps collective protection,
leaders govern at the expense of their citizens, their
state, and—finally—themselves.
How plausible is it that Joseph Smith (or anyone
close to him) could have observed the interplay of
the institutions here considered and imagined such
an authentic world as the one presented in the Book
of Mormon? Until very recently, democracies have
been viewed as government-light—softer and gen-

tler than their nondemocratic peers, and concomitantly, weaker and less decisive. A major proponent
of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville further believed democratic governments to be “decidedly inferior” in matters of international relations.35
In Joseph’s day, Jefferson and Madison worried
about this point when trouble brewed with Britain.
Fearing that Montesquieu was correct in arguing
that democracies tended to be fragmentary, they
feared western states might align against the federal
government in the event of war. While the modern
observer sees the emerging global dominance of
democracy and easily acquiesces to the view that
democracies could be strong rather than weak, this
position has gained currency only as recently as
the end of the Cold War. In presenting the Book of
Mormon to the world, Joseph Smith turned political
theory upside down for no apparent reason. Within
the last couple of decades we have begun to find
that his reversal actually puts the ideas right side up.
The blessings of democratic governance are
easily concealed by more intuitive but misleading
views about political strength. Indeed, as Mosiah
noted, preparing society for peace is an act for
which wisdom—political and spiritual—is a vital
requirement.36 !
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